AUGUST 2026 - The Guardian - clearly exasperated by Netanyahu's deaf ear to EU entreaties - believes the EU and major powers need to "move beyond exhortation." In an editorial the paper said with frankness: "The angry words and exhortations have achieved nothing. Mr Netanyahu and his ministers have generally treated European critics with barely concealed contempt, presumably reassured by the fact that their chief allies in the White House tend to behave in exactly the same fashion."
With Viktor Orban ousted in Hungary Netanyahu has lost a key EU ally with the ability to veto any censure. Spain has become increasinglyvocal over continued EU association with Israel. The Guardian suggests:"As the geopolitical consequences of the spectacularly reckless and illegal US-Israel war on Iran destabilise their economies, European governments can no longer afford to sit on the sidelines and talk to Mr Netanyahu’s hand. That a third of Israel’s trade is done with the EU gives the latter significant cards to play."
The New York Times points to the heavy human toll in Gaza writing in early August: "The ... two-year Israeli military campaign against Hamas laid waste to the Palestinian enclave, killing more than 70,000 people, according to local health officials. Their tally does not specify how many were combatants, but it includes thousands of children."
UK-based Iranian scholar Sahar Maranlou wrote in Al Jazeera 2 August 2026 asking, "Who will shape post-war Iran?" This is a question on many minds in the Middle East and elsewhere too. Commenting on why the US belief that increased pressure will "fracture Teheran" is misplaced, she writes: "divisions exist, but Washington may be misreading how war affects them. For now, external attack has compressed disagreement rather than produced an open rupture. When the fighting subsides, a struggle is likely to emerge over Iran’s recovery. Security institutions can argue that the country endured because it retained the capacity to retaliate and must now restore deterrence. The government is more likely to push for prioritising trade, oil revenues, reconstruction and diplomacy."
The killing of Iran's Supreme Leader she believes "has left the machinery of policy formation intact but weakened the point at which competing preferences are converted into a binding state position. The appointment of his son Mojtaba as his successor has preserved this formal centre of authority, but it has not automatically reproduced the political weight..."
She colcludes: "If Mojtaba cannot impose a common political direction, security institutions may continue to measure success through endurance and the costs imposed on adversaries while the government remains answerable for inflation, damaged infrastructure, negotiations and declining living standards.
"The result would probably not be a formal military takeover. The presidency, parliament and the Supreme National Security Council would continue to function, but their freedom of action could narrow as security priorities increasingly shape the terms of diplomacy, investment and reconstruction."
From earlier, as below.
MARCH 2026 - THE US-Israel attack on Iran purportedly to effect regime change and the killing of the Supreme Leader has evoked strong opinions. Hawks laud military action against a repressive regime while the diplomatically inclined point out that structural change happens bottom-up and not top down. Trump’s call for unarmed Iranians to ‘rise up’ against the Revolutionary Guard and an Establishment protected by long-serving institutions, is a recipe for slaughter without boots on the ground, which in turn would open yet another can of worms.
The New York Times wrote on 28 February, 2026: “The apparent goals of the strikes that began on Saturday, as pronounced by President Trump, are to overturn the regime, destroy its military and end its nuclear capability. But we have seen enough wars to know that even if the United States and Israel, which joined the attack, achieve those stated objectives, Iranians are unlikely to experience peace and stability in the immediate aftermath.”
NYT points to the growing social and religious fault lines in Iran that further complicate the outcome. “…47 years of state violence against ethnic and religious minorities by the Islamic Republic has awakened long-dormant fault lines, significantly raising the specter of sectarian bloodshed in the chaotic aftermath of an invasion.”
A 28 February opinion column by Simon Tisdall of The Guardian opines ‘there was no need for this’. Tisdall writes: “We cannot know where this foolish, reckless attack will end – but new hatreds will be seeded, terrorist vendettas sown and, ultimately, little will be achieved."
He continues: “…the similarities between Donald Trump’s siege of Iran and George W Bush’s disastrous 2003 invasion of Iraq are striking. Both crises fit a wider pattern of ultimately unsuccessful, costly US interventionism dating back to Vietnam – and the 1953 CIA-led Iran coup. Trump promised to avoid foreign adventures. Surprise! He lied.”
“Like Bush, Trump manufactured a crisis, founded on falsehood, and effectively cornered himself. He is hostage to self-imposed expectations, having confounded his own false claim to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities last year.”
The same day Al Jazeera, the well regarded Middle East voice stated unequivocally: “Saturday’s assault came amid negotiations with the US over Iran’s nuclear programme…” It quotes Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi on CBS as saying, “Iran has agreed to give up its stockpile of enriched material – zero accumulation and allow for full verification by the IAEA of its nuclear programme… With zero stockpiling, it becomes impossible to build a bomb regardless of enrichment levels.”
The Times of Israel headlined its analysis thus: "With Iran's leaders battered, Israel hopes to knock out regime by not getting into ring." It continued: "For weeks Israel's closest ally has been openly threatening to strike its arch-nemesis, yet Jerusalem has been notably quiet."
India, which has a stake in Iran’s Chabahar Port as part of its own alternative belt-and-road to Central Asia and Russia is caught in a bind. Somewhat presciently then, Abhishek G Bhaya wrote in the Turkish TRT World in January, “India’s decade-long involvement in Iran’s strategically vital Chabahar Port is under scrutiny, after recent reports suggested New Delhi may be winding down its involvement amid renewed US sanctions and the threat of punitive tariffs.”
The article makes clear that, “According to a detailed report by The Economic Times … India has already transferred the entirety of its financial commitment — estimated at around US$120 million — to Iran, effectively liquidating its liabilities related to the development of the port… The payout was completed before the United States reimposed sanctions on Chabahar in late September 2025, according to Indian government sources cited by the report.”
The Times of India headlined it simply on 1 March 2026 — “India walks tightrope amid Iran conflict.” The paper states that India’s response has been “carefully calibrated” and the country has sought “dialogue and diplomacy” to de-escalate tensions.
Offering the Arab response, Khaleej Times wrote: “The League of Arab States strongly condemned the Iranian aggressions and attacks against the United Arab Emirates, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, considering that the missile attacks constitute a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of states that advocate peace, have worked toward achieving stability, and did not participate in the war.”
– Asian Conversations
